Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a real honour and privilege to be speaking to the parliamentary committee today on what is, I think, an incredibly important topic.

I was going to focus my introductory remarks on the threat posed by Russia in the period ahead, because we need to be very clear-eyed that no matter how events in Ukraine play out, as long as Vladimir Putin remains president of Russia, he will be a determined adversary of Canada, of the United States and of Europe.

Vladimir Putin, I think, is very much driven by seeing the United States, in particular, as Russia's main adversary and as the main obstacle to Russia's geopolitical greatness, and he is consumed by Russia achieving a grand geopolitical stature.

While we have looked at events in Syria with great awe over the last month as sort of a defeat of Russia's efforts in the region, we have to go back roughly 10 years to when Russia intervened in Syria. I was then at the U.S. Department of State, and we were all shocked that here was Russia intervening in a country inside of a civil war in a distant region in the Middle East. Russia had previously, for the past 25 years, focused on its near abroad, and here Russia was in the Middle East, and it made Russia a significant player in the region and helped it build its ties with gulf states and with Israel.

The purpose of this intervention largely was about Russia's ability to act on the global stage and represented Russia for the first time since the end of the Cold War returning to the great power and stature that it had had during the Soviet period. While this past month has been a grand defeat for Russia's grand strategy, it is not going to lie down lightly; it will continue.

What we have to remember, just looking at Russia's military, is that Russia's army has been significantly ground down by the war in Ukraine. It is suffering tremendous casualties of more than half a million, and its ground materiel has been significantly depleted, yet Russia has built up a tremendous defence industrial base and has invested significantly with the help of China and others and its vast smuggling networks, so Russia's production capacity is going to be sustained whether this war ends in 2025 or not, and that will mean, I think, a relatively fast effort to recapitalize its ground forces.

However, when we turn to the other aspects of the Russian military, the Russian navy, the Russian air force and the Russian space capabilities have been far less impacted by this war. What we have also seen is Russia really significantly strengthening its military relationships with not just North Korea and Iran but also China. This means that China is playing an increasing role in the Arctic. This is not something that should cause short-term concern. In many respects, this is driven by China simply looking at the fact that the climate is changing and this is potentially a new and significant global trading route; therefore, it's only natural for China to scope it out militarily.

However, I do think that this portends, down the road and over the long term, a growing Chinese presence in the Arctic. While this may make some Russians uncomfortable, that has been the price of Chinese support for Russia.

As a final comment, I also think that Russia's past history of being, in fact, a rather important actor when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation has been completely reversed by this war. Russia had been a key part of the Iranian nuclear negotiations and sanctions against North Korea, but Russia has reversed that because of the short-term focus on the events in Ukraine, and I don't see it returning. Russia's willingness to provide missile components and other technology to actors like Iran and North Korea, and perhaps others around the world, should be of significant concern to Canada, to the United States and to many in Europe.

I'll close there.