Thank you for this invitation to speak on the situation in Myanmar concerning forced displacement.

I'm here as part of the Myanmar policy and community knowledge hub based at the University of Toronto and supported by the International Development Research Centre. As part of our ongoing research, I would like to share some information about the situation in Myanmar.

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched a coup against the democratically elected government, jailing elected political leaders and MPs. This set into place a nationwide revolt between the military junta and various emergent groups. Initially, thousands took to the street in protest, witnessing mass killings and the arrest of thousands. Many fled and joined resistance groups. Among these groups was a diverse civil disobedience movement; the National Unity Government, or NUG, with its People's Defence Force; and various ethnic revolutionary organizations, EROs, that had been engaging in resistance for decades prior.

The situation has renewed violence and precarity for the Rohingya, who faced one of the biggest displacement crises the world has ever seen in 2016 and who endured a genocidal campaign by the Myanmar military. There are over a million Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh, and hundreds of thousands in Malaysia and Indonesia. The number of Rohingya refugees fleeing Rakhine state in Myanmar has recently surged due to increasing violence, conscription by the Myanmar military, indiscriminate bombing and reports of increasing intercommunal violence, which has boiled tensions between the Rohingya and Rakhine communities.

This coup has not only affected the Rohingya. IDPs face significant insecurity, with conflict, air strikes and land mine use impacting civilians throughout the country. By the UNHCR's most recent count, there are over three million IDPs within Myanmar today. Over 2.8 million of them have been displaced since the coup in 2021.

In Thailand, the number of Burmese people fleeing conflict in Myanmar is likely in the hundreds of thousands if not millions. A report by the UNDP in 2023 found that there were 1.9 million Myanmar migrants in Thailand. As Thailand is not a party to the 1951 refugee convention, most of these migrants, many of whom we met in Thailand in our research, were unable to acquire refugee status or protections. They currently sit in limbo, particularly as the Myanmar military has been restricting passport renewals, which may lead to deportations to Myanmar.

Another cause of displacement was the junta's activation of conscription laws on young men and women in the wake of mass military defections. Many young people who have been out of school or unemployed since the coup are left with the precarious decision of risking conscription, joining resistance forces or fleeing Myanmar. I have family members who have been forced to make that decision.

There is an urgent need for action, as the plight of these displaced peoples is directly linked to regional and global security interests. International criminal gangs, particularly cyber-scam networks, are exploiting the crisis in Myanmar and displaced people.

In closing, I would like to share three broad considerations for the committee about actionable goals towards alleviating the situation in Myanmar.

First, there is a pressing need for cross-border assistance. The vast majority of IDPs in Myanmar, particularly those outside of the control of the Myanmar military, face significant precarity and lack support. Local humanitarian assistance providers depend on systems and networks of cross-border aid from Thailand and India. These are largely funded by the international Myanmar diaspora and various organizations and have even been able to support internal areas in Myanmar, including Bago and Sagaing.

Second, there is a need to work with neighbouring countries to support refugees and migrants. Individuals working on the situation in Myanmar in Thailand noted the precarious conditions of migrants. While there are a variety of local organizations that support migrants, they lack funding and support. Additionally, migrants lack rights and protections, putting them at risk of deportation to Myanmar. Canada should work with Thailand, India and Bangladesh on pathways for refugees and undocumented migrants.

Finally, there's a need to support non-traditional pro-democracy actors who provide assistance and support within Myanmar. Pro-democracy resistance organizations, including the NUG and various EROs, hold jurisdiction in many parts of the country and are subsequently responsible for humanitarian aid, local service delivery and IDP camps.

A study from the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar suggests that the Myanmar military has lost control of 86% of the country's territory. Moreover, 67% of the national population is reported not to be under stable military control and lacks access to traditional humanitarian support mechanisms. Supporting—